§ 8:0. Prevailed on by your continued
solicitations, Balbus, I have engaged in a most difficult task, as my
daily refusals appear to plead not my inability, but indolence, as an
excuse. I have compiled a continuation of the Commentaries of our
Caesar's Wars in Gaul, not indeed to be compared to his writings,
which either precede or follow them; and recently, I have completed
what he left imperfect after the transactions in Alexandria, to the
end, not indeed of the civil broils, to which we see no issue, but of
Caesar's life. I wish that those who may read them could know how
unwillingly I undertook to write them, as then I might the more
readily escape the imputation of folly and arrogance, in presuming to
intrude among Caesar's writings. For it is agreed on all hands, that
no composition was ever executed with so great care, that it is not
exceeded in elegance by these Commentaries, which were published for
the use of historians, that they might not want memoirs of such
achievements; and they stand so high in the esteem of all men, that
historians seem rather deprived of, than furnished with material. At
which we have more reason to be surprised than other men; for they can
only appreciate the elegance and correctness with which he finished
them, while we know with what ease and expedition. Caesar possessed
not only an uncommon flow of language and elegance of style, but also
a thorough knowledge of the method of conveying his ideas. But I had
not even the good fortune to share in the Alexandrian or African war;
and though these were partly communicated to me by Caesar himself, in
conversation, yet we listen with a different degree of attention to
those things which strike us with admiration by their novelty, and
those which we design to attest to posterity. But, in truth, while I
urge every apology, that I may not be compared to Caesar, I incur the
charge of vanity, by thinking it possible that I can in the judgment
of any one be put in competition with him. Farewell. |
Coactus assiduis tuis vocibus, Balbe, cum cotidiana mea recusatio non
difficultatis excusationem, sed inertiae videretur deprecationem habere,
rem difficillimam suscepi. Caesaris nostri commentarios rerum gestarum
Galliae, non comparantibus superioribus atque insequentibus eius
scriptis, contexui novissimumque imperfectum ab rebus gestis Alexandriae
confeci usque ad exitum non quidem civilis dissensionis, cuius finem
nullum videmus, sed vitae Caesaris. Quos utinam qui legent scire possint
quam invitus susceperim scribendos, qua facilius caream stultitiae atque
arrogantiae crimine, qui me mediis interposuerim Caesaris scriptis.
Constat enim inter omnes nihil tam operose ab aliis esse perfectum, quod
non horum elegantia commentariorum superetur: qui sunt editi, ne scientia
tantarum rerum scriptoribus deesset, adeoque probantur omnium iudicio ut
praerepta, non praebita, facultas scriptoribus videatur. Cuius tamen rei
maior nostra quam reliquorum est admiratio: ceteri enim, quam bene atque
emendate, nos etiam, quam facile atque celeriter eos perfecerit scimus.
Erat autem in Caesare cum facultas atque elegantia summa scribendi, tum
verissima scientia suorum consiliorum explicandorum. Mihi ne illud quidem
accidit, ut Alexandrino atque Africano bello interessem; quae bella
quamquam ex parte nobis Caesaris sermone sunt nota, tamen aliter audimus
ea, quae rerum novitate aut admiratione nos capiunt, aliter, quae pro
testimonio sumus dicturi. Sed ego nimirum, dum omnes excusationis causas
colligo ne cum Caesare conferar, hoc ipsum crimen arrogantiae subeo, quod
me iudicio cuiusquam existimem posse cum Caesare comparari. Vale. |
§ 8:1. Gaul being entirely reduced, when Caesar
having waged war incessantly during the former summer, wished to
recruit his soldiers after so much fatigue, by repose in winter
quarters, news was brought him that several states were simultaneously
renewing their hostile intention, and forming combinations. For which
a probable reason was assigned; namely, that the Gauls were convinced
that they were not able to resist the Romans, with any force they
could collect in one place; and hoped that if several states made war
in different places at the same time, the Roman army would neither
have aid, nor time, nor forces, to prosecute them all: nor ought any
single state to decline any inconveniences that might befall them,
provided that by such delay, the rest should be enabled to assert
their liberty. |
Omni Gallia devicta Caesar cum a superiore aestate nullum bellandi
tempus intermisisset militesque hibernorum quiete reficere a tantis
laboribus vellet, complures eodem tempore civitates renovare belli
consilia nuntiabantur coniurationesque facere. Cuius rei verisimilis
causa adferebatur, quod Gallis omnibus cogrutum esset neque ulla
multitudine in unum locum coacta resisti posse Romanis, nec, si diversa
bella complures eodem tempore intulissent civitates, satis auxili aut
spati aut copiarum habiturum exercitum populi Romani ad omnia
persequenda; non esse autem alicui civitati sortem incommodi recusandam,
si tali mora reliquae possent se vindicare in libertatem. |
§ 8:2. That this notion might not be confirmed
among the Gauls, Caesar left Marcus Antonius, his questor, in charge
of his quarters, and set out himself with a guard of horse, the day
before the kalends of January, from the town Bibracte, to the
thirteenth legion, which he had stationed in the country of the
Bituriges, not far from the territories of the Aedui, and joined to it
the eleventh legion which was next it. Leaving two cohorts to guard
the baggage, he leads the rest of his army into the most plentiful
part of the country of the Bituriges; who, possessing an extensive
territory and several towns, were not to be deterred, by a single
legion quartered among them, from making warlike preparation, and
forming combinations. |
Quae ne opinio Gallorum confirmaretur, Caesar Marcum Antonium
quaestorem suis praefecit hibernis; ipse equitum praesidio pridie Kal.
Ianuarias ab oppido Bibracte proficiscitur ad legionem XIII, quam non
longe a finibus Aeduorum collocaverat in finibus Biturigum, eique
adiungit legionem XI, quae proxima fuerat. Binis cohortibus ad
impedimenta tuenda relictis reliquum exercitum in copiosissimos agros
Biturigum inducit, qui, cum latos fines et complura oppida haberent,
unius legionis hibernis non potuerint contineri quin bellum pararent
coniurationesque facerent. |
§ 8:3. By Caesar's sudden arrival, it happened,
as it necessarily must, to an unprovided and dispersed people, that
they were surprised by our horse, while cultivating the fields without
any apprehensions, before they had time to fly to their towns. For the
usual sign of an enemy's invasion, which is generally intimated by the
burning of their towns, was forbidden by Caesar's orders; lest if he
advanced far, forage and corn should become scarce, or the enemy be
warned by the fires to make their escape. Many thousands being taken,
as many of the Bituriges as were able to escape the first coming of
the Romans, fled to the neighboring states, relying either on private
friendship, or public alliance. In vain; for Caesar, by hasty marches,
anticipated them in every place, nor did he allow any state leisure to
consider the safety of others, in preference to their own. By this
activity, he both retained his friends in their loyalty, and by fear,
obliged the wavering to accept offers of peace. Such offers being made
to the Bituriges, when they perceived that through Caesar's clemency,
an avenue was open to his friendship, and that the neighboring states
had given hostages, without incurring any punishment, and had been
received under his protection, they did the same. |
Repentino adventu Caesaris accidit, quod imparatis disiectisque
accidere fuit necesse, ut sine timore ullo rura colentes prius ab
equitatu opprimerentur quam confugere in oppida possent. Namque etiam
illud vulgare incursionis hostium signum, quod incendiis aedificiorum
intellegi consuevit, Caesaris erat interdicto sublatum, ne aut copia
pabuli frumentique, si longius progredi vellet, deficeretur, aut hostes
incendius terrerentur. Multis hominum milibus captis perterriti
Bituriges; qui primum adventum potuerant effugere Romanorum, in finitimas
civitates aut privatis hospitiis confisi aut societate consiliorum
confugerant. Frustra: nam Caesar magni sitineribus omnibus locis occurrit
nec dat ulli civitati spatium de aliena potius quam de domestica salute
cogitandi; qua celeritate et fideles amicos retinebat et dubitantes
terrore ad condiciones pacis adducebat. Tali condicione proposita
Bituriges, cum sibi viderent clementia Caesaris reditum patere in eius
amicitiam finitimasque civitates sine ulla poena dedisse obsides atque in
fidem receptas esse, idem fecerunt. |
§ 8:4. Caesar promises his soldiers, as a reward
for their labor and patience, in cheerfully submitting to hardships
from the severity of the winter, the difficulty of the roads, and the
intolerable cold, two hundred sestertii each, and to every centurian
two thousand, to be given instead of plunder: and sending his legions
back to quarters, he himself returned on the fortieth day to Bibracte.
While he was dispensing justice there, the Bituriges send embassadors
to him, to entreat his aid against the Carnutes, who they complained
had made war against them. Upon this intelligence, though he had not
remained more than eighteen days in winter quarters, he draws the
fourteenth and sixth legion out of quarters on the Saone, where he had
posted them as mentioned in a former Commentary, to procure supplies
of corn. With these two legions he marches in pursuit of the
Carnutes. |
Caesar militibus pro tanto labore ac patientia, qui brumalibus diebus
itineribus difficillimis, frigoribus intolerandis studiosissime
permanserant in labore, ducenos sestertios, centurionibus tot milia
nummum praedae nomine condonanda pollicetur legionibusque in hiberna
remissis ipse se recipit die XXXX Bibracte. Ibi cum ius diceret,
Bituriges ad eum legatos mittunt auxilium petitum contra Carnutes, quos
intulisse bellum sibi querebantur. Qua re cognita, cum dies non amplius
decem et octo in hibernis esset moratus, legiones XIIII et VI ex hibernis
ab Arare educit, quas ibi collocatas explicandae rei frumentariae causa
superiore commentario demonstratum est: ita cum duabus legionibus ad
persequendos Carnutes proficiscitur. |
§ 8:5. When the news of the approach of our army
reached the enemy, the Carnutes, terrified by the suffering of other
states, deserted their villages and towns (which were small buildings,
raised in a hurry, to meet the immediate necessity, in which they
lived to shelter themselves against the winter, for, being lately
conquered, they had lost several towns), and dispersed and fled.
Caesar, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the violent storms that
break out, especially at that season, took up his quarters at Genabum,
a town of the Carnutes; and lodged his men in houses, partly belonging
to the Gauls, and partly built to shelter the tents, and hastily
covered with thatch. But the horse and auxiliaries he sends to all
parts to which he was told the enemy had marched; and not without
effect, as our men generally returned loaded with booty. The Carnutes,
overpowered by the severity of the winter, and the fear of danger, and
not daring to continue long in any place, as they were driven from
their houses, and not finding sufficient protection in the woods, from
the violence of the storms, after losing a considerable number of
their men, disperse, and take refuge among the neighboring
states. |
Cum fama exercitus ad hostes esset perlata, calamitate ceterorum
ducti Carnutes desertis vicis oppidisque, quae tolerandae hiemis causa
constitutis repente exiguis ad necessitatem aedificiis incolebant (nuper
enim devicti complura oppida dimiserant), dispersi profugiunt. Caesar
erumpentes eo maxime tempore acerrimas tempestates cum subire milites
nollet, in oppido Carnutum Cenabo castra ponit atque in tecta partim
Gallorum, partim quae coniectis celeriter stramentis tentoriorum
integendorum gratia erant inaedificata, milites compegit. Equites tamen
et auxiliarios pedites in omnes partes mittit quascumque petisse
dicebantur hostes; nec frustra: nam plerumque magna praeda potiti nostri
revertuntur. Oppressi Carnutes hiemis difficultate, terrore periculi, cum
tectis expulsi nullo loco diutius consistere auderent nec silvarum
praesidio tempestatibus durissimis tegi possent, dispersi magna parte
amissa suorum dissipantur in finitimas civitates. |
§ 8:6. Caesar, being contented, at so severe a
season, to disperse the gathering foes, and prevent any new war from
breaking out, and being convinced, as far as reason could foresee,
that no war of consequence could be set on foot in the summer
campaign, stationed Caius Trebonius, with the two legions which he had
with him, in quarters at Genabum: and being informed by frequent
embassies from the Remi, that the Bellovaci (who exceed all the Gauls
and Belgae in military prowess), and the neighboring states, headed by
Correus, one of the Bellovaci, and Comius, the Atrebatian, were
raising an army, and assembling at a general rendezvous, designing
with their united forces to invade the territories of the Suessiones,
who were put under the patronage of the Remi: and moreover,
considering that not only his honor, but his interest was concerned,
that such of his allies, as deserved well of the republic, should
suffer no calamity; he again draws the eleventh legion out of
quarters, and writes besides to Caius Fabius, to march with his two
legions to the country of the Suessiones; and he sends to Trebonius
for one of his two legions. Thus, as far as the convenience of the
quarters, and the management of the war admitted, he laid the burden
of the expedition on the legions by turns, without any intermission to
his own toils. |
Caesar tempore anni difficillimo, cum satis haberet convenientes
manus dissipare, ne quod initium belli nasceretur, quantumque in ratione
esset, exploratum haberet sub tempus aestivorum nullum summum bellum
posse conflari, Gaium Trebonium cum duabus legionibus, quas secum
habebat, in hibernis Cenabi collocavit; ipse, cum crebris legationibus
Remorum certior fieret Bellovacos, qui belli gloria Gallos omnes
Belgasque praestabant, finitimasque his civitates duce Correo Bellovaco
et Commio Atrebate exercitus comparare atque in unum locum cogere, ut
omni multitudine in fines Suessionum, qui Remis erant attributi, facerent
impressionem, pertinere autem non tantum ad dignitatem sed etiam ad
salutem suam iudicaret nullam calamitatem socios optime de re publica
meritos accipere, legionem ex hibernis evocat rursus undecimam; litteras
autem ad Gaium Fabium mittit, ut in fines Suessionum legiones duas quas
habebat adduceret, alteramque ex duabus ab Labieno arcessit. Ita, quantum
hibernorum opportunitas bellique ratio postulabat, perpetuo suo labore in
vicem legionibus expeditionum onus iniungebat. |
§ 8:7. As soon as his troops were collected, he
marched against the Bellovaci: and pitching his camp in their
territories, detached troops of horse all round the country, to take
prisoners, from whom he might learn the enemy's plan. The horse,
having executed his orders bring him back word, that but few were
found in the houses: and that even these had not stayed at home to
cultivate their lands (for the emigration was general from all parts)
but had been sent back to watch our motions. Upon Caesar's inquiring
from them, where the main body of the Bellovaci were posted, and what
was their design: they made answer, "that all the Bellovaci, fit for
carrying arms, had assembled in one place, and along with them the
Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Velocasses, and Atrebates, and that they
had chosen for their camp, an elevated position, surrounded by a
dangerous morass: that they had conveyed all their baggage into the
most remote woods: that several noblemen were united in the management
of the war; but that the people were most inclined to be governed by
Correus, because they knew that he had the strongest aversion to the
name of the Roman people: that a few days before Comius had left the
camp to engage the Germans to their aid whose nation bordered on
theirs, and whose numbers were countless: that the Bellovaci had come
to a resolution, with the consent of all the generals and the earnest
desire of the people, if Caesar should come with only three legions,
as was reported, to give him battle, that they might not be obliged to
encounter his whole army on a future occasion, when they should be in
a more wretched and distressed condition; but if he brought a stronger
force, they intended to remain in the position they had chosen, and by
ambuscade to prevent the Romans from getting forage (which at that
season was both scarce and much scattered), corn, and other
necessaries. |
His copiis coactis ad Bellovacos proficiscitur castrisque in eorum
finibus positis equitum turmas dimittit in omnes partes ad aliquos
excipiendos ex quibus hostium consilia cognosceret. Equites officio
functi renuntiant paucos in aedificiis esse inventos, atque hos, non qui
agrorum colendorum causa remansissent (namque esse undique diligenter
demigratum), sed qui speculandi causa essent remissi. A quibus cum
quaereret Caesar quo loco multitudo esset Bellovacorum quodve esset
consilium eorum, inveniebat Bellovacos omnes qui arma ferre possent in
unum locum convenisse, itemque Ambianos, Aulercos, Caletos, Veliocasses,
Atrebatas; locum castris excelsum in silva circumdata palude delegisse,
impedimenta omnia in ulteriores silvas contulisse. Complures esse
principes belli auctores, sed multitudinem maxime Correo obtemperare,
quod ei summo esse odio nomen populi Romani intellexissent. Paucis ante
diebus ex his castris Atrebatem Commium discessisse ad auxilia Germanorum
adducenda; quorum et vicinitas propinqua et multitudo esset infinita.
Constituisse autem Bellovacos omnium principum consensu, summa plebis
cupiditate, si, ut diceretur, Caesar cum tribus legionibus veniret,
offerre se ad dimicandum, ne miseriore ac duriore postea condicione cum
toto exercitu decertare cogerentur; si maiores copias adduceret, in eo
loco permanere quem delegissent, pabulatione autem, quae propter anni
tempus cum exigua tum disiecta esset, et frumentatione et reliquo
commeatu ex insidiis prohibere Romanos. |
§ 8:8. When Caesar was convinced of the truth of
this account from the concurring testimony of several persons, and
perceived that the plans which were proposed were full of prudence,
and very unlike the rash resolves of a barbarous people, he considered
it incumbent on him to use every exertion, in order that the enemy
might despise his small force and come to an action. For he had three
veteran legions of distinguished valor, the seventh, eighth and ninth.
The eleventh consisted of chosen youth of great hopes, who had served
eight campaigns, but who, compared with the others, had not yet
acquired any great reputation for experience and valor. Calling
therefore a council, and laying before it the intelligence which he
had received, he encouraged his soldiers. In order if possible to
entice the enemy to an engagement by the appearance of only three
legions, he ranged his army in the following manner, that the seventh,
eighth, and ninth legions should march before all the baggage; that
then the eleventh should bring up the rear of the whole train of
baggage (which however was but small, as is usual on such
expeditions), so that the enemy could not get a sight of a greater
number than they themselves were willing to encounter. By this
disposition he formed his army almost into a square, and brought them
within sight of the enemy sooner than was anticipated. |
Quae Caesar consentientibus pluribus cum cognosset atque ea quae
proponerentur consilia plena prudentiae longeque a temeritate barbarorum
remota esse iudicaret, omnibus rebus inserviendum statuit, quo celerius
hostis contempta sua paucitate prodiret in aciem. Singularis enim
virtutis veterrimas legiones VII, VIII, VIIII habebat, summae spei
delectaeque iuventutis XI, quae octavo iam stipendio tamen in collatione
reliquarum nondum eandem vetustatis ac virtutis ceperat opinionem. Itaque
consilio advocato, rebus eis quae ad se essent delatae omnibus eitis
animos multitudinis confirmat. Si forte hostes trium legionum numero
posset elicere ad dimicandum, agminis ordinem ita constituit, ut legio
septima, octava, nona ante omnia irent impedimenta, deinde omnium
impedimentorum agmen, quod tamen erat mediocre, ut in expeditionibus esse
consuevit, cogeret undecima, ne maioris multitudinis species accidere
hostibus posset quam ipsi depoposcissent. Hac ratione paene quadrato
agmine instructo in conspectum hostium celerius opinione eorum exercitum
adducit. |
§ 8:9. When the Gauls, whose bold resolutions had
been reported to Caesar, saw the legions advance with a regular
motion, drawn up in battle array; either from the danger of an
engagement, or our sudden approach, or with the design of watching our
movements, they drew up their forces before the camp, and did not quit
the rising ground. Though Caesar wished to bring them to battle, yet
being surprised to see so vast a host of the enemy, he encamped
opposite to them, with a valley between them, deep rather than
extensive. He ordered his camp to be fortified with a rampart twelve
feet high, with breastworks built on it proportioned to its height and
two trenches, each fifteen feet broad, with perpendicular sides to be
sunk: likewise several turrets, three stories high, to be raised, with
a communication to each other by galleries laid across and covered
over; which should be guarded in front by small parapets of osiers;
that the enemy might be repulsed by two rows of soldiers. The one of
whom, being more secure from danger by their height might throw their
darts with more daring and to a greater distance; the other which was
nearer the enemy, being stationed on the rampart, would be protected
by their galleries from darts falling on their heads. At the entrance
he erected gates and turrets of a considerable height. |
Cum repente instructas velut in acie certo gradu legiones accedere
Galli viderent, quorum erant ad Caesarem plena fiduciae consilia perlata,
sive certamiuis periculo sive subito adventu sive exspectatione nostri
consili copias instruunt pro castris nec loco superiore decedunt. Caesar,
etsi dimicare optaverat, tamen admiratus tantam multitudinem hostium
valle intermissa magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente castra
castris hostium confert. Haec imperat vallo pedum XII muniri, loriculam
pro [hac] ratione eius altitudinis inaedificari; fossam duplicem pedum
denum quinum lateribus deprimi directis; turres excitari crebras in
altitudinem trium tabulatorum, pontibus traiectis constratisque coniungi,
quorum frontes viminea loricula munirentur; ut ab hostibus duplici fossa,
duplici propugnatorum ordine defenderentur, quorum alter ex pontibus, quo
tutior altitudine esset, hoc audacius longiusque permitteret tela, alter,
qui propior hostem in ipso vallo collocatus esset, ponte ab incidentibus
telis tegeretur. Portis fores altioresque turres imposuit. |
§ 8:10. Caesar had a double design in this
fortification; for he both hoped that the strength of his works, and
his [apparent] fears would raise confidence in the barbarians; and
when there should be occasion to make a distant excursion to get
forage or corn, he saw that his camp would be secured by the works
with a very small force. In the mean time there were frequent
skirmishes across the marsh, a few on both sides sallying out between
the two camps. Sometimes, however, our Gallic or German auxiliaries
crossed the marsh, and furiously pursued the enemy; or on the other
hand the enemy passed it and beat back our men. Moreover there
happened in the course of our daily foraging, what must of necessity
happen, when corn is to be collected by a few scattered men out of
private houses, that our foragers dispersing in an intricate country
were surrounded by the enemy; by which, though we suffered but an
inconsiderable loss of cattle and servants, yet it raised foolish
hopes in the barbarians; but more especially, because Comius, who I
said had gone to get aid from the Germans, returned with some cavalry,
and though the Germans were only 500, yet the barbarians were elated
by their arrival. |
Huius munitionis duplex erat consilium. Namque et operum magnitudinem
et timorem suum sperabat fiduciam barbaris allaturum, et cum pabulatum
frumentatumque longius esset proficiscendum, parvis copiis castra
munitione ipsa videbat posse defendi. Interim crebro paucis utrimque
procurrentibus inter bina castra palude interiecta contendebatur; quam
tamen paludem nonnumquam aut nostra auxilia Gallorum Germanorumque
transibant acriusque hostes insequebantur, aut vicissim hostes eadem
transgressi nostros longius summovebant. Accidebat autem cotidianis
pabulationibus (id quod accidere erat necesse, cum raris disiectisque ex
aedificius pabulum conquireretur), ut impeditis locis dispersi
pabulatores circumvenirentur; quae res, etsi mediocre detrimentum
iumentorum ac servorum nostris adferebat, tamen stultas cogitationes
incitabat barbarorum, atque eo magis, quod Commius, quem profectum ad
auxilia Germanorum arcessenda docui, cum equitibus venerat; qui, tametsi
numero non amplius erant quingenti, tamen Germanorum adventu barbari
nitebantur. |
§ 8:11. Caesar, observing that the enemy kept
for several days within their camp, which was well secured by a morass
and its natural situation, and that it could not be assaulted without
a dangerous engagement, nor the place inclosed with lines without an
addition to his army, wrote to Trebonius to send with all dispatch for
the thirteenth legion which was in winter quarters among the Bituriges
under Titus Sextius, one of his lieutenants; and then to come to him
by forced marches with the three legions. He himself sent the cavalry
of the Remi, and Lingones, and other states, from whom he had required
a vast number, to guard his foraging parties, and to support them in
case of any sudden attack of the enemy. |
Caesar, cum animadverteret hostem complures dies castris palude et
loci natura munitis se tenere neque oppugnari castra eorum sine
dimicatione perniciosa nec locum munitionibus claudi nisi a maiore
exercitu posse, litteras ad Trebonium mittit, ut quam celerrime posset
legionem XIlI, quae cum T. Sextio legato in Biturigibus hiemabat,
arcesseret atque ita cum tribus legionibus magnis itineribus ad se
veniret; ipse equites in vicem Remorum ac Lingonum reliquarumque
civitatum, quorum magnum numerum evocaverat, praesidio pabulationibus
mittit, qui subitas hostium incursiones sustinerent. |
§ 8:12. As this continued for several days, and
their vigilance was relaxed by custom (an effect which is generally
produced by time), the Bellovaci, having made themselves acquainted
with the daily stations of our horse, lie in ambush with a select body
of foot in a place covered with woods; to it they sent their horse the
next day, who were first to decoy our men into the ambuscade, and then
when they were surrounded, to attack them. It was the lot of the Remi
to fall into this snare, to whom that day had been allotted to perform
this duty; for, having suddenly got sight of the enemy's cavalry, and
despising their weakness, in consequence of their superior numbers,
they pursued them too eagerly, and were surrounded on every side by
the foot. Being, by this means thrown into disorder they returned with
more precipitation than is usual in cavalry actions, with the loss of
Vertiscus the governor of their state, and the general of their horse,
who, though scarcely able to sit on horseback through years, neither,
in accordance with the custom of the Gauls, pleaded his age in excuse
for not accepting the command, nor would he suffer them to fight
without him. The spirits of the barbarians were puffed up, and
inflated at the success of this battle, in killing the prince, and
general of the Remi; and our men were taught by this loss, to examine
the country, and post their guards with more caution, and to be more
moderate in pursuing a retreating enemy. |
Quod cum cotidie fieret ac iam consuetudine diligentia minueretur,
quod plerumque accidit diu turnitate, Bellovaci delecta manu peditum
cognitis stationibus cotidianis equitum nostrorum silvestribus locis
insidias disponunt eodemque equites postero die mittunt, qui primum
elicerent nostros, deinde circumventos aggrederentur. Cuius mali sors
incidit Remis, quibus ille dies fungendi muneris obvenerat. Namque hi,
cum repente hostium equites animad vertissent ac numero superiores
paucitatem contempsissent, cupidius insecuti peditibus undique sunt
circumdati. Quo facto perturbati celerius quam consuetudo fert equestris
proeli se receperunt amisso Vertisco, principe civitatis, praefecto
equitum; qui cum vix equo propter aetatem posset uti, tamen consuetudine
Gallorurn neque aetatis excusatione in suscipienda praefectura usus erat
neque dimicari sine se voluerat. Inflantur atque incitantur hostium animi
secundo proelio, principe et praefecto Remorum interfecto, nostrique
detrimento admonentur diligentius exploratis locis stationes disponere ac
mode ratius cedentem insequi hostem. |
§ 8:13. In the mean time daily skirmishes take
place continually in view of both camps; these were fought at the ford
and pass of the morass. In one of these contests the Germans, whom
Caesar had brought over the Rhine, to fight, intermixed with the
horse, having resolutely crossed the marsh, and slain the few who made
resistance, and boldly pursued the rest, so terrified them, that not
only those who were attacked hand to hand, or wounded at a distance,
but even those who were stationed at a greater distance to support
them, fled disgracefully; and being often beaten from the rising
grounds, did not stop till they had retired into their camp, or some,
impelled by fear, had fled further. Their danger threw their whole
army into such confusion, that it was difficult to judge whether they
were more insolent after a slight advantage or more dejected by a
trifling calamity. |
Non intermittunt interim cotidiana proelia in conspectu utrorumque
castrorum, quae ad vada transitus que fiebant paludis. Qua contentione
Germani, quos propterea Caesar traduxerat Rhenum ut equitibus interpositi
proeliarentur, cum constantius universi paludem transissent paucisque
resistentibus interfectis pertinacius reliquam multitudinem essent
insecuti, perterriti non solum ei qui aut comminus opprimebantur aut
eminus vulnerabantur, sed etiam qui longius subsidiari consuerant,
turpiter refugerunt, nec prius finem fugae fecerunt saepe amissis
superioribus locis quam se aut in castra suorum reciperent, aut nonnulli
pudore coacti longius profugerent. Quorum periculo sic omnes copiae sunt
perturbatae ut vix iudicari posset, utrum secundis minimisque rebus
insolentiores an adverso mediocri casu timidiores essent. |
§ 8:14. After spending several days in the same
camp, the guards of the Bellovaci, learning that Caius Trebonius was
advancing nearer with his legions, and fearing a siege like that of
Alesia, send off by night all who were disabled by age or infirmity,
or unarmed, and along with them their whole baggage. While they are
preparing their disorderly and confused troop for march (for the Gauls
are always attended by a vast multitude of wagons, even when they have
very light baggage), being overtaken by day- light, they drew their
forces out before their camp, to prevent the Romans attempting a
pursuit before the line of their baggage had advanced to a
considerable distance. But Caesar did not think it prudent to attack
them when standing on their defense, with such a steep hill in their
favor, nor keep his legions at such a distance that they could quit
their post without danger: but, perceiving that his camp was divided
from the enemy's by a deep morass, so difficult to cross that he could
not pursue with expedition, and that the hill beyond the morass, which
extended almost to the enemy's camp, was separated from it only by a
small valley, he laid a bridge over the morass and led his army
across, and soon reached the plain on the top of the hill, which was
fortified on either side by a steep ascent. Having there drawn up his
army in order of battle, he marched to the furthest hill, from which
he could, with his engines, shower darts upon the thickest of the
enemy. |
Compluribus diebus isdem in castris consumptis, cum propius
accessisse legiones et Gaium Trebonium legatum cognossent, duces
Bellovacorum veriti similem obsessionem Alesiae noctu dimittunt eos quos
aut aetate aut viribus inferiores aut inermes habebant, unaque reliqua
impedimenta. Quorum perturbatum et confusum dum explicant agmen (magna
enim multitudo carrorum etiam expeditos sequi Gallos consuevit), oppressi
luce copias armatorum pro suis instruunt castris, ne prius Romani
persequi se inciperent quam longius agmen impedimentorum suorum
processisset. At Caesar neque resistentes adgrediendos tanto collis
ascensu iudicabat, neque non usque eo legiones admovendas ut discedere ex
eo loco sine periculo barbari militibus instantibus non possent. Ita, cum
palude impedita a castris castra dividi videret, quae trans eundi
difficultas celeritatem insequendi tardare posset, adque id iugum quod
trans paludem paene ad hostium castra pertineret mediocri valle a castris
eorum intercisum animum adverteret, pontibus palude constrata legiones
traducit celeriterque in summam planitiem iugi pervenit, quae declivi
fastigio duobus ab lateribus muniebatur. Ibi legionibus instructis ad
ultimum iugum pervenit aciemque eo loco constituit unde tormento missa
tela in llostium cuneos conici possent. |
§ 8:15. The Gauls, confiding in the natural
strength of their position, though they would not decline an
engagement if the Romans attempted to ascend the hill, yet dared not
divide their forces into small parties, lest they should be thrown
into disorder by being dispersed, and therefore remained in order of
battle. Caesar, perceiving that they persisted in their resolution,
kept twenty cohorts in battle array, and, measuring out ground there
for a camp, ordered it to be fortified. Having completed his works, he
drew up his legions before the rampart and stationed the cavalry in
certain positions, with their horses bridled. When the Bellovaci saw
the Romans prepared to pursue them, and that they could not wait the
whole night, or continue longer in the same place without provisions,
they formed the following plan to secure a retreat. They handed to one
another the bundles of straw and sticks on which they sat (for it is
the custom of the Gauls to sit when drawn up in order of battle, as
has been asserted in former commentaries), of which they had great
plenty in their camp, and piled them in the front of their line; and
at the close of the day, on a certain signal, set them all on fire at
one and the same time. The continued blaze soon screened all their
forces from the sight of the Romans, which no sooner happened than the
barbarians fled with the greatest precipitation. |
Barbari confisi loci natura, cum dimicare non recusarent, si forte
Romani subire collem conarentur, paulatim copias distributas dimittere
non possent, ne dispersi perturbarentur, in acie permanserunt. Quorum
pertinacia cogruta Caesar XX cohortibus instructis castrisque eo loco
metatis muniri iubet castra. Absolutis operibus pro vallo legiones
instructas collocat, equites frenatis equis in statione disponit.
Bellovaci, cum Romanos ad insequendum paratos viderent neque pernoctare
aut diutius permanere sine periculo eodem loco possent, tale consilium
sui recipiendi ceperunt. Fasces, ubi consederant (namque in acie sedere
Gallos consuesse superioribus commentariis Caesaris declaratum est), per
manus stramentorum ac virgultorum, quorum summa erat in castris copia,
inter se traditos ante aciem collocarunt extremoque tempore diei signo
pronuntiato uno tempore incenderunt. Ita continens flamma copias omnes
repente a conspectu texit Romanorum. Quod ubi accidit, barbari
vehementissimo cursu refugerunt. |
§ 8:16. Though Caesar could not perceive the
retreat of the enemy for the intervention of the fire, yet, suspecting
that they had adopted that method to favor their escape, he made his
legions advance, and sent a party of horse to pursue them; but,
apprehensive of an ambuscade, and that the enemy might remain in the
same place and endeavor to draw our men into a disadvantageous
situation, he advances himself but slowly. The horse, being afraid to
venture into the smoke and dense line of flame, and those who were
bold enough to attempt it being scarcely able to see their horse's
heads, gave the enemy free liberty to retreat, through fear of an
ambuscade. Thus by a flight, full at once of cowardice and address,
they advanced without any loss about ten miles, and encamped in a very
strong position. From which, laying numerous ambuscades, both of horse
and foot, they did considerable damage to the Roman foragers. |
Caesar, etsi discessum hostium animadvertere non poterat incendiis
oppositis, tamen id consilium cum fugae causa initum suspicaretur,
legiones promovet, turmas mittit ad insequendum; ipse veritus insidias,
ne forte in eodem loco subsistere hostis atque elicere nostros in locum
conaretur iniquum, tardius procedit. Equites cum intrare fumum et flammam
densissimam timerent ac, si qui cupidius intraverant, vix suorum ipsi
priores partes animadverterent equorum, insidias veriti liberam
facultatem sui recipiendi Bellovacis dederunt. Ita fuga timoris simul
calliditatisque plena sine ullo detrimento milia non amplius decem
progressi hostes loco munitissimo castra posuerunt. Inde cum saepe in
insidiis equites peditesque disponerent, magna detrimenta Romanis in
pabulationibus inferebant. |
§ 8:17. After this had happened several times,
Caesar discovered from a certain prisoner, that Correus, the general
of the Bellovaci, had selected six thousand of his bravest foot and a
thousand horse, with which he designed to lie in ambush in a place to
which he suspected the Romans would send to look for forage, on
account of the abundance of corn and grass. Upon receiving information
of their design Caesar drew out more legions than he usually did, and
sent forward his cavalry as usual, to protect the foragers. With these
he intermixed a guard of light infantry, and himself advanced with the
legions as fast as he could. |
Quod cum crebrius accideret, ex captivo quodam comperit Caesar
Correum, Bellovacorum ducem, fortissimorum milia sex peditum delegisse
equitesque ex omni numero mille, quos in insidiis eo loco collocaret,
quem in locum propter copiam frumenti ac pabuli Romanos missuros
suspicaretur. Quo cognito consilio legiones plures quam solebat educit
equitatumque, qua consuetudine pabulatoribus mittere praesidio consuerat,
praemittit: huic interponit auxilia levis armaturae; ipse cum legionibus
quam potest maxime appropinquat. |
§ 8:18. The Gauls, placed in ambush, had chosen
for the seat of action a level piece of ground, not more than a mile
in extent, inclosed on every side by a thick wood or a very deep
river, as by a toil, and this they surrounded. Our men, apprised of
the enemy's design, marched in good order to the ground, ready both in
heart and hand to give battle, and willing to hazard any engagement
when the legions were at their back. On their approach, as Correus
supposed that he had got an opportunity of effecting his purpose, he
at first shows himself with a small party and attacks the foremost
troops. Our men resolutely stood the charge, and did not crowd
together in one place, as commonly happens from surprise in
engagements between the horse, whose numbers prove injurious to
themselves. |
Hostes in insidus dispositi, cum sibi delegissent campum ad rem
gerendam non amplius patentem in omnes partes passibus mille, silvis
undique aut impeditissimo flumine munitum, velut indagine hunc insidiis
circumdederunt. Explorato hostium consilio nostri ad proeliandum animo
atque armis parati, cum subsequentibus legionibus nullam dimicationem
recusarent, turmatim in eum locum devenerunt. Quorum adventu cum sibi
Correus oblatam occasionem rei gerendae existimaret, primum cum paucis se
ostendit atque in proximas turmas impetum fecit. Nostri constanter
incursum sustinent insidiatorum neque plures in unum locum conveniunt;
quod plerumque equestribus proeliis cum propter aliquem timorem accidit,
tum multitudine ipsorum detrimentum accipitur. |
§ 8:19. When by the judicious arrangement of our
forces only a few of our men fought by turns, and did not suffer
themselves to be surrounded, the rest of the enemy broke out from the
woods while Correus was engaged. The battle was maintained in
different parts with great vigor, and continued for a long time
undecided, till at length a body of foot gradually advanced from the
woods in order of battle and forced our horse to give ground: the
light infantry, which were sent before the legions to the assistance
of the cavalry, soon came up, and, mixing with the horse, fought with
great courage. The battle was for some time doubtful, but, as usually
happens, our men, who stood the enemy's first charge, became superior
from this very circumstance that, though suddenly attacked from an
ambuscade, they had sustained no loss. In the mean time the legions
were approaching, and several messengers arrived with notice to our
men and the enemy that the [Roman] general was near at hand, with his
forces in battle array. Upon this intelligence, our men, confiding in
the support of the cohorts, fought most resolutely, fearing, lest if
they should be slow in their operations they should let the legions
participate in the glory of the conquest. The enemy lose courage and
attempt to escape by different ways. In vain; for they were themselves
entangled in that labyrinth in which they thought to entrap the
Romans. Being defeated and put to the rout, and having lost the
greater part of their men, they fled in consternation whithersoever
chance carried them; some sought the woods, others the river, but were
vigorously pursued by our men and put to the sword. Yet, in the mean
time, Correus, unconquered by calamity, could not be prevailed on to
quit the field and take refuge in the woods, or accept our offers of
quarter, but, fighting courageously and wounding several, provoked our
men, elated with victory, to discharge their weapons against him. |
Cum dispositis turmis in vicem rari proeliarentur neque ab lateribus
circumveniri suos paterentur, erumpunt ceteri Correo proeliante ex
silvis. Fit magna contentione diversum proelium. Quod cum diutius pari
Marte iniretur, paulatim ex silvis instructa multitudo procedit peditum,
quae nostros coegit cedere equites. Quibus celeriter subveniunt levis
armaturae pedites, quos ante legiones missos docui, turmisque nostrorum
interpositi constanter proeliantur. Pugnatur aliquamdiu pari contentione;
deinde, ut ratio postulabat proeli, qui sustinuerant primos impetus
insidiarum hoc ipso fiunt superiores, quod nullum ab insidiantibus
imprudentes acceperant detrimentum. Accedunt propius interim legiones,
crebrique eodem tempore et nostris et hostibus nuntii adferuntur,
imperatorem instructis copiis adesse. Qua re cognita praesidio cohortium
confisi nostri acerrime proeliantur, ne, si tardius rem gessissent,
victoriae gloriam communicasse cum legionibus viderentur; hostes
concidunt animis atque itineribus diversis fugam quaerunt. Nequiquam: nam
quibus difficultatibus locorum Romanos claudere voluerant, eis ipsi
tenebantur. Victi tamen perculsique maiore parte amissa consternati
profugiunt partim silvis petitis, partim flumine (qui tamen in fuga a
nostris acriter insequentibus conficiuntur), eum interim nulla calamitate
victus Correus excedere proelio silvasque petere aut invitantibus nostris
ad deditionem potuit adduci, quin fortissime proeliando compluresque
vulnerando cogeret elatos iracundia victores in se tela conicere. |
§ 8:20. After this transaction, Caesar, having
come up immediately after the battle, and imagining that the enemy,
upon receiving the news of so great a defeat, would be so depressed
that they would abandon their camp, which was not above eight miles
distant from the scene of action, though he saw his passage obstructed
by the river, yet he marched his army over and advanced. But the
Bellovaci and the other states, being informed of the loss they had
sustained by a few wounded men who having escaped by the shelter of
the woods, had returned to them after the defeat, and learning that
every thing had turned out unfavorable, that Correus was slain, and
the horse and most valiant of their foot cut off, imagined that the
Romans were marching against them, and calling a council in haste by
sound of trumpet, unanimously cry out to send embassadors and hostages
to Caesar. |
Tali modo re gesta recentibus proeli vestigiis ingressus Caesar, cum
victos tanta calamitate existimaret hostes nuntio accepto locum castrorum
relicturos, quae non longius ab ea caede abesse plus minus octo milibus
dicebantur, tametsi flumine impeditum transitum videbat, tamen exercitu
traducto progreditur. At Bellovaci reliquaeque civitates repente ex fuga
paucis atque his vulneratis receptis, qui silvarum benefieio casum
evitaverant, omnibus adversis, cognita calamitate, interfecto Correo,
amisso equitatu et fortissimis pcditibus, cum adventare Romanos
existimarent, concilio repente cantu tubarum convocato conclamant, legati
obsidesque ad Caesarem mittantur. |
§ 8:21. This proposal having met with general
approbation, Comius the Atrebatian fled to those Germans from whom he
had borrowed auxiliaries for that war. The rest instantly send
embassadors to Caesar; and requested that he would be contented with
that punishment of his enemy, which if he had possessed the power to
inflict on them before the engagement, when they were yet uninjured,
they were persuaded from his usual clemency and mercy, he never would
have inflicted; that the power of the Bellovaci was crushed by the
cavalry action; that many thousand of their choicest foot had fallen,
that scarce a man had escaped to bring the fatal news. That, however,
the Bellovaci had derived from the battle one advantage, of some
importance, considering their loss; that Correus, the author of the
rebellion, and agitator of the people, was slain: for that while he
lived the senate had never equal influence in the state with the giddy
populace. |
Hoc omnibus probato consilio Commius Atrebas ad eos confugit
Germanos, a quibus ad id bellum auxilia mutuatus erat. Ceteri e vestigio
mittunt ad Caesarem legatos petuntque, ut ea poena sit contentus hostium,
quam si sine dimicatione inferre integris posset, pro sua clementia atque
humanitate numquam profecto esset illaturus. Adflictas opes equestri
proelio Bellovacorum esse; delectorum peditum multa milia interisse, vix
refugisse nuntios caedis. Tamen magnum ut in tanta calamitate Bellovacos
eo proelio commodum esse consecutos, quod Correus, auctor belli,
concitator multitudinis, esset interfectus. Numquam enim senatum tantum
in civitate illo vivo quantum imperitam plebem potuisse. |
§ 8:22. Caesar reminded the embassadors who made
these supplications, that the Bellovaci had at the same season the
year before, in conjunction with other states of Gaul, undertaken a
war, and that they had persevered the most obstinately of all in their
purpose, and were not brought to a proper way of thinking by the
submission of the rest: that he knew and was aware that the guilt of a
crime was easily transferred to the dead; but that no one person could
have such influence, as to be able by the feeble support of the
multitude to raise a war and carry it on without the consent of the
nobles, in opposition to the senate, and in despite of every virtuous
man; however he was satisfied with the punishment, which they had
drawn upon themselves. |
Haec orantibus legatis commemorat Caesar: Eodem tempore superiore
anno Bellovacos ceterasque Galliae civitates suscepisse bellum:
pertinacissime hos ex omnibus in sententia permansisse neque ad sanitatem
reliquorum deditione esse perductos. Scire atque intellegere se causam
peccati facillime mortuis delegari. Neminem vero tantum pollere, ut
invitis principibus, resistente senatu, omnibus bonis repugnantibus
infirma manu plebis bellum concitare et gerere posset. Sed tamen se
contentum fore ea poena quam sibi ipsi contraxissent. |
§ 8:23. The night following the embassadors
bring back his answer to their countrymen and prepare the hostages.
Embassadors flock in from the other states, which were waiting for the
issue of the [war with the] Bellovaci: they give hostages, and receive
his orders; all except Comius, whose fears restrained him from
intrusting his safety to any person's honor. For the year before,
while Caesar was holding the assizes in Hither Gaul, Titus Labienus,
having discovered that Comius was tampering with the state, and
raising a conspiracy against Caesar, thought he might punish his
infidelity without perfidy; but judging that he would not come to his
camp at his invitation, and unwilling to put him on his guard by the
attempt, he sent Caius Volusenus Quadratus, with orders to have him
put to death under pretense of conference. To effect his purpose, he
sent with him some chosen centurions. When they came to the
conference, and Volusenus, as had been agreed on, had taken hold of
Comius by the hand, and one of the centurions, as if surprised at so
uncommon an incident, attempted to kill him, he was prevented by the
friends of Comius, but wounded him severely in the head by the first
blow. Swords were drawn on both sides, not so much with a design to
fight as to effect an escape, our men believing that Comius had
received a mortal stroke; and the Gauls, from the treachery which they
had seen, dreading that a deeper design lay concealed. Upon this
transaction, it was said that Comius made a resolution never to come
within sight of any Roman. |
Nocte insequenti legati responsa ad suos referunt, obsides
conficiunt. Concurrunt reliquarum civitatium legati, quae Bellovacorum
speculabantur eventum; obsides dant, imperata faciunt excepto Commio,
quem timor prohibebat cuiusquam fidei suam committere salutem. Nam
superiore anno Titus Labienus, Caesare in Gallia citeriore ius dicente,
cum Commium comperisset sollicitare civitates et coniurationem contra
Caesarem facere, infidelitatem eius sine ulla perfidia iudicavit comprimi
posse. Quem quia non arbitrabatur vocatum in castra venturum, ne
temptando cautiorem faceret, Gaium Volusenum Quadratum misit, qui eum per
simulationem colloqui curaret interficiendum. Ad eam rem delectos idoneos
ei tradit centuriones. Cum in colloquium ventum esset, et, ut convenerat,
manum Commi Volusenus arripuisset, centurio vel insueta re permotus vel
celeriter a familiaribus prohibitus Commi conficere hominem non potuit;
graviter tamen primo ictu gladio caput percussit. Cum utrimque gladii
destricti essent, non tam pugnandi quam diffugiendi fuit utrorumque
consilium: nostrorum, quod mortifero vulnere Commium credebant adfectum;
Gallorum, quod insidius cognitis plura quam videbant extimescebant. Quo
facto statuisse Commius dicebatur numquam in conspectum cuiusquam Romani
venire. |
§ 8:24. When Caesar, having completely conquered
the most warlike nations, perceived that there was now no state which
could make preparations for war to oppose him, but that some were
removing and fleeing from their country to avoid present subjection,
he resolved to detach his army into different parts of the country. He
kept with himself Marcus Antonius the quaestor, with the eleventh
legion; Caius Fabius was detached with twenty-five cohorts into the
remotest part of Gaul, because it was rumored that some states had
risen in arms, and he did not think that Caius Caninius Rebilus, who
had the charge of that country, was strong enough to protect it with
two legions. He ordered Titus Labienus to attend himself, and sent the
twelfth legion which had been under him in winter quarters, to Hither
Gaul, to protect the Roman colonies, and prevent any loss by the
inroads of barbarians similar to that which had happened the year
before to the Tergestines, who were cut off by a sudden depredation
and attack. He himself marched to depopulate the country of Ambiorix,
whom he had terrified and forced to fly, but despaired of being able
to reduce under his power; but he thought it most consistent with his
honor to waste his country both of inhabitants, cattle, and buildings,
so that from the abhorrence of his countrymen, if fortune suffered any
to survive, he might be excluded from a return to his state for the
calamities which he had brought on it. |
Bellicosissimis gentibus devictis Caesar, cum videret nullam iam esse
civitatem quae bellum pararet quo sibi resisteret, sed nonnullos ex
oppidis demigrare, ex agris diffugere ad praesens imperium evitandum,
plures in partes exercitum dimittere constituit. M. Antonium quaestorem
cum legione duodecima sibi coniungit. C. Fabium legatum cum cohortibus
XXV mittit in diversissimam partem Galliae, quod ibi quasdam civitates in
armis esse audiebat neque C. Caninium Rebilum legatum, qui in illis
regionibus erat, satis firmas duas legiones habere existimabat. Titum
Labienum ad se evocat; legionem autem XV, quae cum eo fuerat in hibernis,
in togatam Galliam mittit ad colonias civium Romanorum tuendas, ne quod
simile incommodum accideret decursione barbarorum ac superiore aestate
Tergestinis acciderat, qui repentino latrocinio atque impetu illorum
erant oppressi. Ipse ad vastandos depopulandosque fines Ambiorigis
proficiscitur; quem perterritum ac fugientem cum redigi posse in suam
potestatem desperasset, proximum suae dignitatis esse ducebat, adeo fines
eius vastare civibus, aedificiis, pecore, ut odio suorum Ambiorix, si
quos fortuna reliquos fecisset, nullum reditum propter tantas calamitates
haberet in civitatem. |
§ 8:25. After he had sent either his legions or
auxiliaries through every part of Ambiorix's dominions, and wasted the
whole country by sword, fire, and rapine, and had killed or taken
prodigious numbers, he sent Labienus with two legions against the
Treviri, whose state, from its vicinity to Germany, being engaged in
constant war, differed but little from the Germans, in civilization
and savage barbarity; and never continued in its allegiance, except
when awed by the presence of his army. |
Cum in omnes partes finium Ambiorigis aut legiones aut auxilia
dimisisset atque omnia caedibus, incendius, rapinis vastasset, magno
numero hominum interfecto aut capto Labienum cum duabus legionibus in
Treveros mittit, quorum civitas propter Germaniae vicinitatem cotidianis
exercitata bellis cultu et feritate non multum a Germanis differebat
neque imperata umquam nisi exercitu coacta faciebat. |
§ 8:26. In the mean time Caius Caninius, a
lieutenant, having received information by letters and messages from
Duracius, who had always continued in friendship to the Roman people,
though a part of his state had revolted, that a great multitude of the
enemy were in arms in the country of the Pictones, marched to the town
Limonum. When he was approaching it, he was informed by some
prisoners, that Duracius was shut up by several thousand men, under
the command of Dumnacus, general of the Andes, and that Limonum was
besieged, but not daring to face the enemy with his weak legions, he
encamped in a strong position: Dumnacus, having notice of Caninius's
approach, turned his whole force against the legions, and prepared to
assault the Roman camp. But after spending several days in the
attempt, and losing a considerable number of men, without being able
to make a breach in any part of the works, he returned again to the
siege of Limonum. |
Interim Gaius Caninius legatus, cum magnam multitudinem convenisse
hostium in fines Pictonum litteris nuntiisque Durati cognosceret, qui
perpetuo in amicitia manserat Romanorum, cum pars quaedam civitatis eius
defecisset, ad oppidum Lemonum contendit. Quo cum adventaret atque ex
captivis certius cognosceret multis hominum milibus a Dumnaco, duce
Andium, Duratium clausum Lemoni oppugnari neque infirmas legiones
hostibus committere auderet, castra posuit loco munito. Dumnacus, cum
appropinquare Caninium cognosset, copiis omnibus ad legiones conversis
castra Romanorum oppugnare instituit. Cum complures dies in oppugnatione
consumpsisset et magno suorum detrimento nullam partem munitionum
convellere potuisset, rursus ad obsidendum Lemonum redit. |
§ 8:27. At the same time, Caius Fabius, a
lieutenant, brings back many states to their allegiance, and confirms
their submission by taking hostages; he was then informed by letters
from Caninius, of the proceedings among the Pictones. Upon which he
set off to bring assistance to Duracius. But Dumnacus, hearing of the
approach of Fabius, and despairing of safety, if at the same time he
should be forced to withstand the Roman army without, and observe, and
be under apprehension from the town's people, made a precipitate
retreat from that place with all his forces. Nor did he think that he
should be sufficiently secure from danger, unless he led his army
across the Loire, which was too deep a river to pass except by a
bridge. Though Fabius had not yet come within sight of the enemy, nor
joined Caninius; yet being informed of the nature of the country, by
persons acquainted with it, he judged it most likely that the enemy
would take that way, which he found they did take. He therefore
marched to that bridge with his army, and ordered his cavalry to
advance no farther before the legions than that they could return to
the same camp at night, without fatiguing their horses. Our horse
pursued according to orders, and fell upon Dumnacus's rear and
attacking them on their march, while fleeing, dismayed, and laden with
baggage, they slew a great number, and took a rich booty. Having
executed the affair so successfully, they retired to the camp. |
Eodem tempore C. Fabius legatus complures civitates in fidem recipit,
obsidibus firmat litterisque Gai Canini Rebili fit certior quae in
Pictonibus gerantur. Quibus rebus cognitis proficiscitur ad auxilium
Duratio ferendum. At Dumnacus adventu Fabi cognito desperata salute, si
tempore eodem coactus esset et Romanum externum sustinere hostem et
respicere ac timere oppidanos, repente ex eo loco cum copiis recedit nec
se satis tutum fore arbitratur, nisi flumine Ligeri, quod erat ponte
propter magnitudinem transeundum, copias traduxisset. Fabius, etsi nondum
in conspectum venerat hostibus neque se Caninio coniunxerat, tamen doctus
ab eis qui locorum noverant naturam potissimum credidit hostes
perterritos eum locum, quem petebant, petituros. Itaque cum copiis ad
eundem pontem contendit equitatumque tantum procedere ante agmen imperat
legionum, quantum cum processisset, sine defatigatione equorum in eadem
se reciperet castra. Consecuntur equites nostri, ut erat praeceptum,
invaduntque Dumnaci agmen et fugientes perterritosque sub sarcinis in
itinere adgressi magna praeda multis interfectis potiuntur. Ita re bene
gesta se recipiunt in castra. |
§ 8:28. The night following, Fabius sent his
horse before him, with orders to engage the enemy, and delay their
march till he himself should come up. That his orders might be
faithfully performed, Quintus Atius Varus, general of the horse, a man
of uncommon spirit and skill, encouraged his men, and pursuing the
enemy, disposed some of his troops in convenient places, and with the
rest gave battle to the enemy. The enemy's cavalry made a bold stand,
the foot relieving each other, and making a general halt, to assist
their horse against ours. The battle was warmly contested. For our
men, despising the enemy whom they had conquered the day before, and
knowing that the legions were following them, animated both by the
disgrace of retreating, and a desire of concluding the battle
expeditiously by their own courage, fought most valiantly against the
foot: and the enemy, imagining that no more forces would come against
them, as they had experienced the day before, thought they had got a
favorable opportunity of destroying our whole cavalry. |
Insequenti nocte Fabius equites praemittit sic paratos ut
confligerent atque omne agmen morarentur, dum consequeretur ipse. Cuius
praeceptis ut res gereretur, Quintus Atius Varus, praefectus equitum,
singularis et animi et prudentiae vir, suos hortatur agmenque hostium
consecutus turmas partim idoneis locis disponit, parte equitum proelium
committit. Confligit audacius equitatus hostium succedentibus sibi
peditibus, qui toto agmine subsistentes equitibus suis contra nostros
ferunt auxilium. Fit proelium acri certamine. Namque nostri contemptis
pridie superatis hostibus, cum subsequi legiones meminissent, et pudore
cedendi et cupiditate per se conficiendi proeli fortissime contra pedites
proeliantur, hostesque nihil amplius copiarum accessurum credentes, ut
pridie cognoverant, delendi equitatus nostri nacti occasionem
videbantur. |
§ 8:29. After the conflict had continued for
some time with great violence, Dumnacus drew out his army in such a
manner, that the foot should by turns assist the horse. Then the
legions, marching in close order, came suddenly in sight of the enemy.
At this sight, the barbarian horse were so astonished, and the foot so
terrified, that breaking through the line of baggage, they betook
themselves to flight with a loud shout, and in great disorder. But our
horse, who a little before had vigorously engaged them, while they
made resistance, being elated with joy at their victory, raising a
shout on every side, poured round them as they ran, and as long as
their horses had strength to pursue, or their arms to give a blow, so
long did they continue the slaughter of the enemy in that battle, and
having killed above twelve thousand men in arms, or such as threw away
their arms through fear, they took their whole train of baggage. |
Cum aliquamdiu summa contentione dimicaretur, Dumnacus instruit aciem
quae suis esset equitibus in vicem praesidio, cum repente confertae
legiones in conspectum hostium veniunt. Quibus visis perculsae barbarorum
turmae ac perterritae acies hostium, perturbato impedimentorum agmine,
magno clamore discursuque passim fugae se mandant. At nostri equites, qui
paulo ante cum resistentibus fortissime conflixerant, laetitia victoriae
elati magno undique clamore sublato cedentibus circumfusi, quantum
equorum vires ad persequendum dextraeque ad caedendum valent, tantum eo
proelio interficiunt. Itaque amplius milibus XII aut armatorum aut eorum
qui eo timore arma proiecerant interfectis omnis multitudo capitur
impedimentorum. |
§ 8:30. After this defeat, when it was
ascertained that Drapes, a Senonian (who in the beginning of the
revolt of Gaul had collected from all quarters men of desperate
fortunes, invited the slaves to liberty, called in the exiles of the
whole kingdom, given an asylum to robbers, and intercepted the Roman
baggage and provisions), was marching to the province with five
thousand men, being all he could collect after the defeat, and that
Luterius a Cadurcian who, as it has been observed in a former
commentary, had designed to make an attack on the Province in the
first revolt of Gaul, had formed a junction with him, Caius Caninius
went in pursuit of them with two legions, lest great disgrace might be
incurred from the fears or injuries done to the Province by the
depredations of a band of desperate men. |
Qua ex fuga cum constaret Drappetem Senonem, qui, ut primum defecerat
Gallia, collectis undique perditis hominibus, servis ad libertatem
vocatis, exulibus omnium civitatum adscitis, receptis latronibus
impedimenta et commeatus Romanorum interceperat, non amplius hominum
duobus milibus ex fuga collectis provinciam petere unaque consilium cum
eo Lucterium Cadurcum cepisse, quem superiore commentario prima
defectione Galliae facere in provinciam voluisse impetum cognitum est,
Caninius legatus cum legionibus duabus ad eos persequendos contendit, ne
detrimento aut timore provinciae magna infamia perditorum hominum
latrociniis caperetur. |
§ 8:31. Caius Fabius set off with the rest of
the army to the Carnutes and those other states, whose force he was
informed, had served as auxiliaries in that battle, which he fought
against Dumnacus. For he had no doubt that they would be more
submissive after their recent sufferings, but if respite and time were
given them, they might be easily excited by the earnest solicitations
of the same Dumnacus. On this occasion Fabius was extremely fortunate
and expeditious in recovering the states. For the Carnutes, who,
though often harassed had never mentioned peace, submitted and gave
hostages: and the other states, which lie in the remotest parts of
Gaul, adjoining the ocean, and which are called Armoricae, influenced
by the example of the Carnutes, as soon as Fabius arrived with his
legions, without delay comply with his command. Dumnacus, expelled
from his own territories, wandering and skulking about, was forced to
seek refuge by himself in the most remote parts of Gaul. |
Gaius Fabius cum reliquo exercitu in Carnutes ceterasque
proficiscitur civitates, quarum eo proelio, quod cum Dumnaco fecerat,
copias esse accisas sciebat. Non enim dubitabat quin recenti calamitate
summissiores essent futurae, dato vero spatio ac tempore eodem instigante
Dumnaco possent concitari. Qua in re summa felicitas celeritasque in
recipiendis civitatibus Fabium consequitur. Nam Carnutes, qui saepe
vexati numquam pacis fecerant mentionem, datis obsidibus veniunt in
deditionem, ceteraeque civitates positae in ultimis Galliae finibus
Oceano coniunctae, quae Armoricae appellantur, auctoritate adductae
Carnutum adventu Fabi legio numque imperata sine mora faciunt. Dumnacus
suis finibus expulsus errans latitansque solus extremas Galliae regiones
petere est coactus. |
§ 8:32. But Drapes in conjunction with Luterius,
knowing that Caninius was at hand with the legions, and that they
themselves could not without certain destruction enter the boundaries
of the province, while an army was in pursuit of them, and being no
longer at liberty to roam up and down and pillage, halt in the country
of the Cadurci, as Luterius had once in his prosperity possessed a
powerful influence over the inhabitants, who were his countrymen, and
being always the author of new projects, had considerable authority
among the barbarians; with his own and Drapes' troops he seized
Uxellodunum, a town formerly in vassalage to him, and strongly
fortified by its natural situation; and prevailed on the inhabitants
to join him. |
At Drappes unaque Lucterius, cum legiones Caniniumque adesse
cognoscerent nec se sine certa pernicie persequente exercitu putarent
provinciae fines intrare posse nec iam libere vagandi latrociniorumque
faciendorum facultatem haberent, in finibus consistunt Cadurcorum. Ibi
cum Lucterius apud suos cives quondam integris rebus multum potuisset,
semperque auctor novorum consiliorum magnam apud barbaros auctoritatem
haberet, oppidum Vxellodunum, quod in clientela fuerat eius, egregie
natura loci munitum, occupat suis et Drappetis copiis oppidanosque sibi
coniungit. |
§ 8:33. After Caninius had rapidly marched to
this place, and perceived that all parts of the town were secured by
very craggy rocks, which it would be difficult for men in arms to
climb even if they met with no resistance; and moreover, observing
that the town's people were possessed of effects, to a considerable
amount, and that if they attempted to convey them away in a
clandestine manner, they could not escape our horse, or even our
legions; he divided his forces into three parts, and pitched three
camps on very high ground, with the intention of drawing lines round
the town by degrees, as his forces could bear the fatigue. |
Quo cum confestim Gaius Caninius venisset animadverteretque omnes
oppidi partes praeruptissimis saxis esse munitas, quo defendente nullo
tamen armatis ascendere esset difficile, magna autem impedimenta
oppidanorum videret, quae si clandestina fuga subtrahere conarentur,
effugere non modo equitatum, sed ne legiones quidem possent, tripertito
cohortibus divisis trina excelsissimo loco castra fecit; a quibus
paulatim, quantum copiae patiebantur, vallum in oppidi circuitum ducere
instituit. |
§ 8:34. When the townsmen perceived his design,
being terrified by the recollection of the distress at Alesia, they
began to dread similar consequences from a siege; and above all
Luterius, who had experienced that fatal event, cautioned them to make
provisions of corn; they therefore resolve by general consent to leave
part of their troops behind, and set out with their light troops to
bring in corn. The scheme having met with approbation, the following
night Drapes and Luterius leaving two thousand men in the garrison,
marched out of the town with the rest. After a few days' stay in the
country of the Cadurci (some of whom were disposed to assist them with
corn, and others were unable to prevent their taking it) they
collected a great store. Sometimes also attacks were made on our
little forts by sallies at night. For this reason Caninius deferred
drawing his works round the whole town, lest he should be unable to
protect them when completed, or by disposing his garrisons in several
places, should make them too weak. |
Quod cum animadverterent oppidani miserrimaque Alesiae memoria
solliciti similem casum obsessionis vererentur, maximeque ex omnibus
Lucterius, qui fortunae illius periculum fecerat, moneret frumenti
rationem esse habendam, constituunt omnium consensu parte ibi relicta
copiarum ipsi cum expeditis ad importandum frumentum proficisci. Eo
consilio probato proxima nocte duobus milibus armatorum relictis reliquos
ex oppido Drappes et Lucterius educunt. Hi paucos dies morati ex finibus
Cadurcorum, qui partim re frumentaria sublevare eos cupiebant, partim
prohibere quo minus sumerent non poterant, magnum numerum frumenti
comparant, nonnumquam autem expeditionibus nocturnis castella nostrorum
adoriuntur. Quam ob causam Gaius Caninius toto oppido munitiones
circumdare moratur, ne aut opus effectum tueri non possit aut plurimis in
locis infirma disponat praesidia. |
§ 8:35. Drapes and Luterius, having laid in a
large supply of corn, occupying a position at about ten miles distance
from the town, intending from it to convey the corn into the town by
degrees. They chose each his respective department. Drapes stayed
behind in the camp with part of the army to protect it; Luterius
conveys the train with provisions into the town. Accordingly, having
disposed guards here and there along the road, about the tenth hour of
the night, he set out by narrow paths through the woods, to fetch the
corn into the town. But their noise being heard by the sentinels of
our camp, and the scouts which we had sent out, having brought an
account of what was going on, Caninius instantly with the ready-armed
cohorts from the nearest turrets made an attack on the convoy at the
break of day. They, alarmed at so unexpected an evil, fled by
different ways to their guard: which as soon as our men perceived,
they fell with great fury on the escort, and did not allow a single
man to be taken alive. Luterius escaped thence with a few followers,
but did not return to the camp. |
Magna copia frumenti comparata considunt Drappes et Lucterius non
longius ab oppido X milibus, unde paulatim frumentum in oppidum
supportarent. Ipsi inter se provincias partiuntur: Drappes castris
praesidio cum parte copiarum restitit; Lucterius agmen iumentorum ad
oppidum ducit. Dispositis ibi praesidiis hora noctis circiter decima
silvestribus angustisque itineribus frumentum importare in oppidum
instituit. Quorum strepitum vigiles castrorum cum sensissent,
exploratoresque missi quae gererentur renuntiassent, Caninius celeriter
cum cohortibus armatis ex proximis castellis in frumentarios sub ipsam
lucem impetum fecit. Ei repentino malo perterriti diffugiunt ad sua
praesidia; quae nostri ut viderunt, acrius contra armatos incitati
neminem ex eo numero vivum capi patiuntur. Profugit inde cum paucis
Lucterius nec se recipit in eastra. |
§ 8:36. After this success, Caninius learned
from some prisoners, that a part of the forces was encamped with
Drapes, not more than ten miles off: which being confirmed by several,
supposing that after the defeat of one general, the rest would be
terrified, and might be easily conquered, he thought it a most
fortunate event that none of the enemy had fled back from the
slaughter to the camp, to give Drapes notice of the calamity which had
befallen him. And as he could see no danger in making the attempt, he
sent forward all his cavalry and the German foot, men of great
activity, to the enemy's camp. He divides one legion among the three
camps, and takes the other without baggage along with him. When he had
advanced near the enemy, he was informed by scouts, which he had sent
before him, that the enemy's camp, as is the custom of barbarians, was
pitched low, near the banks of a river, and that the higher grounds
were unoccupied: but that the German horse had made a sudden attack on
them, and had begun the battle. Upon this intelligence, he marched up
with his legion, armed and in order of battle. Then, on a signal being
suddenly given on every side, our men took possession of the higher
grounds. Upon this the German horse observing the Roman colors, fought
with great vigor. Immediately all the cohorts attack them on every
side; and having either killed or made prisoners of them all, gained
great booty. In that battle, Drapes himself was taken prisoner. |
Re bene gesta Caninius ex captivis comperit partem copiarum cum
Drappete esse in castris a milibus longe non amplius XII. Qua re ex
compluribus cognita, cum intellegeret fugato duce altero perterritos
reliquos facile opprimi posse, magnae felicitatis esse arbitrabatur
neminem ex caede refugisse in castra qui de accepta calamitate nuntium
Drappeti perferret. Sed in experiendo cum periculum nullum videret,
equitatum omnem Germanosque pedites, summae velocitatis homines, ad
castra hostium praemittit; ipse legionem unam in trina castra distribuit,
alteram secum expeditam ducit. Cum propius hostes accessisset, ab
exploratoribus quos praemiserat cognoscit castra eorum, ut barbarorum
fere consuetudo est, relictis locis superioribus ad ripas fluminis esse
demissa; at Germanos equitesque imprudentibus omnibus de improviso
advolasse proeliumque commisisse. Qua re cognita legionem armatam
instructamque adducit. Ita repente omnibus ex partibus signo dato loca
superiora capiuntur. Quod ubi accidit, Germani equitesque signis legionis
visis vehementissime proeliantur. Confestim cohortes undique impetum
faciunt omnibusque aut interfectis aut captis magna praeda potiuntur.
Capitur ipse eo proelio Drappes. |
§ 8:37. Caninius, having accomplished the
business so successfully, without having scarcely a man wounded,
returned to besiege the town; and, having destroyed the enemy without,
for fear of whom he had been prevented from strengthening his
redoubts, and surrounding the enemy with his lines, he orders the work
to be completed on every side. The next day, Caius Fabius came to join
him with his forces, and took upon him the siege of one side. |
Caninius felicissime re gesta sine ullo paene militis vulnere ad
obsidendos oppidanos revertitur externoque hoste deleto, cuius timore
antea dividere praesidia et munitione oppidanos circumdare prohibitus
erat, opera undique imperat administrari. Venit eodem cum suis copiis
postero die Gaius Fabius partemque oppidi sumit ad obsidendum. |
§ 8:38. In the mean time, Caesar left Caius
Antonius in the country of the Bellovaci, with fifteen cohorts, that
the Belgae might have no opportunity of forming new plans in future.
He himself visits the other states, demands a great number of
hostages, and by his encouraging language allays the apprehensions of
all. When he came to the Carnutes, in whose state he has in a former
commentary mentioned that the war first broke out; observing, that
from a consciousness of their guilt, they seemed to be in the greatest
terror: to relieve the state the sooner from its fear, he demanded
that Guturvatus, the promoter of that treason, and the instigator of
that rebellion, should be delivered up to punishment. And though the
latter did not dare to trust his life even to his own countrymen, yet
such diligent search was made by them all, that he was soon brought to
our camp. Caesar was forced to punish him, by the clamors of the
soldiers, contrary to his natural humanity, for they alleged that all
the dangers and losses incurred in that war, ought to be imputed to
Guturvatus. Accordingly, he was whipped to death, and his head cut
off. |
Caesar interim M. Antonium quaestorem cum cohortibus XV in Bellovacis
relinquit, ne qua rursus novorum consiliorum capiendorum Belgis facultas
daretur. Ipse reliquas civitates adit, obsides plures imperat, timentes
omnium animos consolatione sanat. Cum in Carnutes venisset, quorum in
civitate superiore commentario Caesar euit initium belli esse ortum, quod
praecipue eos propter conscientiam facti timere animadvertebat, quo
celerius civitatem timore liberaret, principem sceleris illius et
concitatorem belli, Gutruatum, ad supplicium depoposcit. Qui etsi ne
civibus quidem suis se committebat, tamen celeriter omnium cura quaesitus
in castra perducitur. Cogitur in eius supplicium Caesar contra suam
naturam concursu maximo militum, qui ei omnia pericula et detrimenta
belli accepta referebant, adeo ut verberibus exanimatum corpus securi
feriretur. |
§ 8:39. Here Caesar was informed by numerous
letters from Caninius of what had happened to Drapes and Luterius, and
in what conduct the town's people persisted: and though he despised
the smallness of their numbers, yet he thought their obstinacy
deserving a severe punishment, lest Gaul in general should adopt an
idea that she did not want strength but perseverance to oppose the
Romans; and lest the other states, relying on the advantage of
situation, should follow their example and assert their liberty;
especially as he knew that all the Gauls understood that his command
was to continue but one summer longer, and if they could hold out for
that time, that they would have no further danger to apprehend. He
therefore left Quintus Calenus, one of his lieutenants, behind him,
with two legions, and instructions to follow him by regular marches.
He hastened as much as he could with all the cavalry to Caninius. |
Ibi crebris litteris Canini fit certior quae de Drappete et Lucterio
gesta essent, quoque in consilio permanerent oppidani. Quorum etsi
paucitatem contemnebat, tamen pertinaciam magna poena esse adficiendam
iudicabat, ne universa Gallia non sibi vires defuisse ad resistendum
Romanis, sed constantiam putaret, neve hoc exemplo ceterae civitates
locorum opportunitate fretae se vindicarent in libertatem, cum omnibus
Gallis notum esse sciret reliquam esse unam aestatem suae provinciae,
quam si sustinere potuissent, nullum ultra periculum vererentur. Itaque
Q. Calenum legatum cum legionibus reliquit qui iustis itineribus
subsequeretur; ipse cum omni equitatu quam potest celerrime ad Caninium
contendit. |
§ 8:40. Having arrived at Uxellodunum, contrary
to the general expectation, and perceiving that the town was
surrounded by the works, and that the enemy had no possible means of
retiring from the assault, and being likewise informed by the
deserters that the townsmen had abundance of corn, he endeavoured to
prevent their getting water. A river divided the valley below, which
almost surrounded the steep craggy mountain on which Uxellodunum was
built. The nature of the ground prevented his turning the current: for
it ran so low down at the foot of the mountain, that no drains could
be sunk deep enough to draw it off in any direction. But the descent
to it was so difficult, that if we made opposition, the besieged could
neither come to the river nor retire up the precipice without hazard
of their lives. Caesar perceiving the difficulty, disposed archers and
slingers, and in some places, opposite to the easiest descents, placed
engines, and attempted to hinder the townsmen from getting water at
the river, which obliged them afterward to go all to one place to
procure water. |
Cum contra exspectationem omnium Caesar Vxellodunum venisset
oppidumque operibus clausum animadverteret neque ab oppugnatione recedi
videret ulla condicione posse, magna autem copia frumenti abundare
oppidanos ex perfugis cognosset, aqua prohibere hostem temptare coepit.
Flumen infimam vallem dividebat, quae totum paene montem cingebat, in quo
positum erat praeruptum undique oppidum Vxellodunum. Hoc avertere loci
natura prohibebat: in infimis enim sic radicibus montis ferebatur, ut
nullam in partem depressis fossis derivari posset. Erat autem oppidanis
difficilis et praeruptus eo descensus, ut prohibentibus nostris sine
vulneribus ac periculo vitae neque adire flumen neque arduo se recipere
possent ascensu. Qua difficultate eorum cogmta Caesar sagittariis
funditoribusque dispositis, tormentis etiam quibusdam locis contra
facillimos descensus collocatis aqua fluminis prohibebat oppidanos. |
§ 8:41. Close under the walls of the town, a
copious spring gushed out on that part, which for the space of nearly
three hundred feet, was not surrounded by the river. While every other
person wished that the besieged could be debarred from this spring,
Caesar alone saw that it could be effected, though not without great
danger. Opposite to it he began to advance the vineae toward the
mountain, and to throw up a mound, with great labor and continual
skirmishing. For the townsmen ran down from the high ground, and
fought without any risk, and wounded several of our men, yet they
obstinately pushed on and were not deterred from moving forward the
vineae, and from surmounting by their assiduity the difficulties of
situation. At the same time they work mines, and move the crates and
vineae to the source of the fountain. This was the only work which
they could do without danger or suspicion. A mound sixty feet high was
raised; on it was erected a turret of ten stories, not with the
intention that it should be on a level with the wall (for that could
not be effected by any works), but to rise above the top of the
spring. When our engines began to play from it upon the paths that led
to the fountain, and the townsmen could not go for water without
danger, not only the cattle designed for food and the working cattle,
but a great number of men also died of thirst. |
Quorum omnis postea multitudo aquatorum unum in locum conveniebat sub
ipsius oppidi murum, ubi magnus fons aquae prorumpebat ab ea parte, quae
fere pedum CCC intervallo fluminis circuitu vacabat. Hoc fonte prohiberi
posse oppidanos cum optarent reliqui, Caesar unus videret, e regione eius
vineas agere adversus montem et aggerem instruere coepit magno cum labore
et continua dimicatione. Oppidani enim loco superiore decurrunt et eminus
sine periculo proeliantur multosque pertinaciter succedentes vulnerant;
non deterrentur tamen milites nostri vineas proferre et labore atque
operibus locorum vincere difficultates. Eodem tempore cuniculos tectos ab
vineis agunt ad caput fontis; quod genus operis sine ullo periculo, sine
suspicione hostium facere licebat. Exstruitur agger in altitudinem pedum
sexaginta, collocatur in eo turris decem tabulatorum, non quidem quae
moenibus aequaret (id enim nullis operibus effici poterat), sed quae
superare fontis fastigium posset. Ex ea cum tela tormentis iacerentur ad
fontis aditum, nec sine periculo possent aquari oppidani, non tantum
pecora atque iumenta, sed etiam magna hostium multitudo siti
consumebatur. |
§ 8:42. Alarmed at this calamity, the townsmen
fill barrels with tallow, pitch, and dried wood: these they set on
fire, and roll down on our works. At the same time, they fight most
furiously, to deter the Romans, by the engagement and danger, from
extinguishing the flames. Instantly a great blaze arose in the works.
For whatever they threw down the precipice, striking against the
vineae and agger, communicated the fire to whatever was in the way.
Our soldiers on the other hand, though they were engaged in a perilous
sort of encounter, and laboring under the disadvantages of position,
yet supported all with very great presence of mind. For the action
happened in an elevated situation, and in sight of our army; and a
great shout was raised on both sides; therefore every man faced the
weapons of the enemy and the flames in as conspicuous a manner as he
could, that his valor might be the better known and attested. |
Quo malo perterriti oppidani cupas sebo, pice, scandulis complent;
eas ardentes in opera provolvunt eodemque tempore acerrime proeliantur,
ut ab incendio restinguendo dimicationis periculo deterreant Romanos.
Magna repente in ipsis operibus flamma exstitit. Quaecumque enim per
locum praecipitem missa erant, ea vineis et aggere suppressa
comprehendebant id ipsum quod morabatur. Milites contra nostri, quamquam
periculoso genere proeli locoque iniquo premebantur, tamen omnia
fortissimo sustinebant animo. Res enim gerebatur et excelso loco et in
conspectu exercitus nostri, magnusque utrimque clamor oriebatur. Ita quam
quisque poterat maxime insignis, quo notior testatiorque virtus esset
eius, telis hostium flammaeque se offerebat. |
§ 8:43. Caesar, observing that several of his
men were wounded, ordered the cohorts to ascend the mountain on all
sides, and, under pretense of assailing the walls, to raise a shout:
at which the besieged being frightened, and not knowing what was going
on in other places, call off their armed troops from attacking our
works, and dispose them on the walls. Thus our men without hazarding a
battle, gained time partly to extinguish the works which had caught
fire, and partly to cut off the communication. As the townsmen still
continued to make an obstinate resistance, and even, after losing the
greatest part of their forces by drought, persevered in their
resolution: at last the veins of the spring were cut across by our
mines, and turned from their course. By this their constant spring was
suddenly dried up, which reduced them to such despair that they
imagined that it was not done by the art of man, but the will of the
gods; forced, therefore, by necessity, they at length submitted. |
Caesar cum complures suos vulnerari videret, ex omnibus oppidi
partibus cohortes montem ascendere et simulatione moenium occupandorum
clamorem undique iubet tollere. Quo facto perterriti oppidani, cum quid
ageretur in locis reliquis essent suspensi, revocant ab impugnandis
operibus armatos murisque disponunt. Ita nostri fine proeli facto
celeriter opera flamma comprehensa partim restinguunt, partim
interscindunt. Cum pertinaciter resisterent oppidani, magna etiam parte
amissa siti suorum in sententia permanerent, ad postremum cuniculis venae
fontis intercisae sunt atque aversac. Quo facto repente perennis exaruit
fons tantamque attulit oppidanis salutis desperationem, ut id non hominum
consilio, sed deorum voluntate factum putarent. Itaque se necessitate
coacti tradiderunt. |
§ 8:44. Caesar, being convinced that his lenity
was known to all men, and being under no fears of being thought to act
severely from a natural cruelty, and perceiving that there would be no
end to his troubles if several states should attempt to rebel in like
manner and in different places, resolved to deter others by inflicting
an exemplary punishment on these. Accordingly he cut off the hands of
those who had borne arms against him. Their lives he spared, that the
punishment of their rebellion might be the more conspicuous. Drapes,
who I have said was taken by Caninius, either through indignation and
grief arising from his captivity, or through fear of severer
punishments, abstained from food for several days, and thus perished.
At the same time, Luterius, who, I have related, had escaped from the
battle, having fallen into the hands of Epasnactus, an Arvernian (for
he frequently changed his quarters, and threw himself on the honor of
several persons, as he saw that he dare not remain long in one place,
and was conscious how great an enemy he deserved to have in Caesar),
was by this Epasnactus, the Arvernian, a sincere friend of the Roman
people, delivered without any hesitation, a prisoner to Caesar. |
Caesar, cum suam lenitatem cognnitam omnibus sciret neque vereretur
ne quid crudelitate naturae videretur asperius fecisse, neque exitum
consiliorum suorum animadverteret, si tali ratione diversis in locis
plures consilia inissent, exemplo supplici deterrendos reliquos
existimavit. Itaque omnibus qui arma tulerant manus praecidit vitamque
concessit, quo testatior esset poena improborum. Drappes, quem captum
esse a Caninio docui, sive indignitate et dolore vinculorum sive timore
gravioris supplici paucis diebus cibo se abstinuit atque ita interiit.
Eodem tempore Lacterius, quem profugisse ex proelio scripsi, cum in
potestatem venisset Epasnacti Arverni (crebro enim mutandis locis
multorum fidei se committebat, quod nusquam diutius sine periculo
commoraturus videbatur, cum sibi conscius esset, quam inimicum deberet
Caesarem habere), hunc Epasnactus Arvernus, amicissimus populi Romani,
sine dubitatione ulla vinctum ad Caesarem deduxit. |
§ 8:45. In the mean time, Labienus engages in a
successful cavalry action among the Treviri; and, having killed
several of them and of the Germans, who never refused their aid to any
person against the Romans, he got their chiefs alive into his power,
and, among them, Surus, an Aeduan, who was highly renowned both for
his valor and birth, and was the only Aeduan that had continued in
arms till that time. |
Labienus interim in Treveris equestre proelium facit secundum
compluribusque Treveris interfectis et Germanis, qui nullis adversus
Romanos auxilia denegabant, principes eorum vivos redigit in suam
potestatem atque in his Surum Aedmlm, qui et virtutis et generis summam
nobilitatem habebat solusque ex Aeduis ad id tempus permanserat in
armis. |
§ 8:46. Caesar, being informed of this, and
perceiving that he had met with good success in all parts of Gaul, and
reflecting that, in former campaigns [Celtic] Gaul had been conquered
and subdued; but that he had never gone in person to Aquitania, but
had made a conquest of it, in some degree, by Marcus Crassus, set out
for it with two legions, designing to spend the latter part of the
summer there. This affair he executed with his usual dispatch and good
fortune. For all the states of Aquitania sent embassadors to him and
delivered hostages. These affairs being concluded, he marched with a
guard of cavalry toward Narbo, and drew off his army into winter
quarters by his lieutenants. He posted four legions in the country of
the Belgae, under Marcus Antonius, Caius Trebonius, Publius Vatinius,
and Quintus Tullius, his lieutenants. Two he detached to the Aedui,
knowing them to have a very powerful influence throughout all Gaul.
Two he placed among the Turoni, near the confines of the Carnutes, to
keep in awe the entire tract of country bordering on the ocean; the
other two he placed in the territories of the Lemovices, at a small
distance from the Arverni, that no part of Gaul might be without an
army. Having spent a few days in the province, he quickly ran through
all the business of the assizes, settled all public disputes, and
distributed rewards to the most deserving; for he had a good
opportunity of learning how every person was disposed toward the
republic during the general revolt of Gaul, which he had withstood by
the fidelity and assistance of the Province. |
Ea re cognita Caesar, cum in omnibus partibus Galliae bene res geri
videret iudicaretque superioribus aestivis Galliam devictam subactamque
esse, Aquitaniam numquam adisset, per Publium Crassum quadam ex parte
devicisset, cum duabus legionibus in eam partem Galliae est profectus, ut
ibi extremum tempus consumeret aestivorum. Quam rem sicuti cetera
celeriter feliciterque confecit. Namque omnes Aquitaniae civitates
legatos ad Caesarem miserunt obsidesque ei dederunt. Quibus rebus gestis
ipse equitum praesidio Narbonem profecto est, exercitum per legatos in
hiberna deduxit: quattuor legiones in Belgio collocavit cum M. Antonio et
C. Trebonio et P. Vatinio legatis, duas legiones in Aeduos deduxit,
quorum in omni Gallia summam esse auctoritatem sciebat, duas in Turonis
ad fines Carnutum posuit, quae omnem illam regionem coniunctam Oceano
continerent, duas reliquas in Lemovicum finibus non longe ab Arvernis, ne
qua pars Galliae vacua ab exercitu esset. Paucos dies ipse in provincia
moratus, cum celeriter omnes conventus percucurrisset, publicas
controversias cognosset, bene meritis praemia tribuisset (cognoscendi
enim maximam facultatem habebat, quali quisque fuisset animo in totius
Galliae defectione, quam sustinuerat fidelitate atque auxiliis provinciae
illius), his confectis rebus ad legiones in Belgium se recipit
hibernatque Nemetocennae. |
§ 8:47. Having finished these affairs, he
returned to his legions among the Belgae and wintered at Nemetocenna:
there he got intelligence that Comius, the Atrebatian had had an
engagement with his cavalry. For when Antonius had gone into winter
quarters, and the state of the Atrebates continued in their
allegiance, Comius, who, after that wound which I before mentioned,
was always ready to join his countrymen upon every commotion, that
they might not want a person to advise and head them in the management
of the war, when his state submitted to the Romans, supported himself
and his adherents on plunder by means of his cavalry, infested the
roads, and intercepted several convoys which were bringing provisions
to the Roman quarters. |
Ibi cognoscit Commium Atrebatem proelio cum equitatu suo contendisse.
Nam cum Antonius in hiberna venisset, civitasque Atrebatum in officio
esset, Commius, qui post illam vulnerationem, quam supra commemoravi,
semper ad omnes motus paratus suis civibus esse consuesset, ne consilia
belli quaerentibus auctor armorum duxque deesset, parente Romanis
civitate cum suis equitibus latrociniis se suos que alebat infestisque
itineribus commeatus complures, qui comportabantur in hiberna Romanorum,
intercipiebat. |
§ 8:48. Caius Volusenus Quadratus was appointed
commander of the horse under Antonius, to winter with him: Antonius
sent him in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry; now Volusenus added to
that valor which was pre- eminent in him, a great aversion to Comius,
on which account he executed the more willingly the orders which he
received. Having, therefore, laid ambuscades, he had several
encounters with his cavalry and came off successful. At last, when a
violent contest ensued, and Volusenus, through eagerness to intercept
Comius, had obstinately pursued him with a small party; and Comius
had, by the rapidity of his flight, drawn Volusenus to a considerable
distance from his troops, he, on a sudden, appealed to the honor of
all about him for assistance not to suffer the wound, which he had
perfidiously received, to go without vengeance; and, wheeling his
horse about, rode unguardedly before the rest up to the commander. All
his horse following his example, made a few of our men turn their
backs and pursued them. Comius, clapping spurs to his horse, rode up
to Volusenus, and, pointing his lance, pierced him in the thigh with
great force. When their commander was wounded, our men no longer
hesitated to make resistance, and, facing about, beat back the enemy.
When this occurred, several of the enemy, repulsed by the great
impetuosity of our men, were wounded, and some were trampled to death
in striving to escape, and some were made prisoners. Their general
escaped this misfortune by the swiftness of his horse. Our commander,
being severely wounded, so much so that he appeared to run the risk of
losing his life, was carried back to the camp. But Comius, having
either gratified his resentment, or, because he had lost the greatest
part of his followers, sent embassadors to Antonius, and assured him
that he would give hostages as a security that he would go wherever
Antonius should prescribe, and would comply with his orders, and only
entreated that this concession should be made to his fears, that he
should not be obliged to go into the presence of any Roman. As
Antonius judged that his request originated in a just apprehension, he
indulged him in it and accepted his hostages. Caesar, I know, has made
a separate commentary of each year's transactions, which I have not
thought it necessary for me to do, because the following year, in
which Lucius Paulus and Caius Marcellus were consuls, produced no
remarkable occurrences in Gaul. But that no person may be left in
ignorance of the place where Caesar and his army were at that time,
have thought proper to write a few words in addition to this
commentary. |
Erat attributus Antonio praefectus equitum C. Volusenus Quadratus qui
cum eo hibernaret. Hunc Antonius ad persequendum equitatum hostium
mittit. Volusenus ad eam virtutem, quae singularis erat in eo, magnum
odium Commi adiungebat, quo libentius id faceret quod imperabatur. Itaque
dispositis insidiis saepius equites eius adgressus secunda proelia
faciebat. Novissime, cum vehementius contenderetur, ac Volusenus ipsius
intercipiendi Commi cupiditate pertinacius eum cum paucis insecutus
esset, ille autem fuga vehementi Volusenum produxisset longius, inimicus
homini suorum invocat fidem atque auxilium, ne sua vulnera per fidem
imposita paterentur impunita, conversoque equo se a ceteris incautius
permittit in praefectum. Faciunt hoc idem omnes eius equites paucosque
nostros convertunt atque insequuntur. Commius incensum calcaribus equum
coniungit equo Quadrati lanceaque infesta magnis viribus medium femur
traicit Voluseni. Praefecto vulnerato non dubitant nostri resistere et
conversis equis hostem pellere. Quod ubi accidit, complures hostium magno
nostrorum impetu perculsi vulnerantur ac partim in fuga proteruntur,
partim intercipiuntur; quod malum dux equi velocitate evitavit: graviter
adeo vulneratus praefectus, ut vitae periculum aditurus videretur,
refertur in castra. Commius autem sive expiato suo dolore sive magna
parte amissa suorum legatos ad Antonium mittit seque et ibi futurum, ubi
praescripserit, et ea facturum, quae imperarit, obsidibus firmat; unum
illud orat, ut timori suo concedatur, ne in conspectum veniat cuiusquam
Romani. Cuius postulationem Antonius cum iudicaret ab iusto nasci timore,
veniam petenti dedit, obsides accepit. Scio Caesarem singulorum annorum
singulos commentarios confecisse; quod ego non existimavi mihi esse
faciendum, propterea quod insequens annus, L. Paulo C. Marcello
consulibus, nullas habet magnopere Galliae res gestas. Ne quis tamen
ignoraret, quibus in locis Caesar exercitusque eo tempore fuissent, pauca
esse scribenda coniungendaque huic commentario statui. |
§ 8:49. Caesar, while in winter quarters in the
country of the Belgae, made it his only business to keep the states in
amity with him, and to give none either hopes of, or pretext for a
revolt. For nothing was further from his wishes than to be under the
necessity of engaging in another war at his departure; lest, when he
was drawing his army out of the country, any war should be left
unfinished, which the Gauls would cheerfully undertake, when there was
no immediate danger. Therefore, by treating the states with respect,
making rich presents to the leading men, imposing no new burdens, and
making the terms of their subjection lighter, he easily kept Gaul
(already exhausted by so many unsuccessful battles) in obedience. |
Caesar in Belgio cum hiemaret, unum illud propositum habebat,
continere in amicitia civitates, nulli spem aut causam dare armorum.
Nihil enim minus volebat quam sub decessu suo necessitatem sibi aliquam
imponi belli gerendi, ne, cum exercitum deducturus esset, bellum aliquod
relinqueretur quod omnis Gallia libenter sine praesenti periculo
susciperet. Itaque honorifice civitates appellando, principes maximis
praemiis adficiendo, nulla onera iniungendo defessam tot adversis
proeliis Galliam condicione parendi meliore facile in pace
continuit. |
§ 8:50. When the winter quarters were broken up
he himself, contrary to his usual practice, proceeded to Italy, by the
longest possible stages, in order to visit the free towns and
colonies, that he might recommend to them the petition of Marcus
Antonius, his treasurer, for the priesthood. For he exerted his
interest both cheerfully in favor of a man strongly attached to him,
whom he had sent home before him to attend the election, and zealously
to oppose the faction and power of a few men, who, by rejecting Marcus
Antonius, wished to undermine Caesar's influence when going out of
office. Though Caesar heard on the road, before he reached Italy that
he was created augur, yet he thought himself in honor bound to visit
the free towns and colonies, to return them thanks for rendering such
service to Antonius by their presence in such great numbers [at the
election], and at the same time to recommend to them himself, and his
honor in his suit for the consulate the ensuing year. For his
adversaries arrogantly boasted that Lucius Lentulus and Caius
Marcellus had been appointed consuls, who would strip Caesar of all
honor and dignity: and that the consulate had been injuriously taken
from Sergius Galba, though he had been much superior in votes and
interest, because he was united to Caesar, both by friendship, and by
serving as lieutenant under him. |
Ipse hibernis peractis contra consuetudinem in Italiam quam maximis
itineribus est profectus, ut municipia et colonias appellaret, quibus M.
Antoni quaestoris sui, commendaverat sacerdoti petitionem. Contendebat
enim gratia cum libenter pro homine sibi coniunctissimo, quem paulo ante
praemiserat ad petitionem, tum acriter contra factionem et potentiam
paucorum, qui M. Antoni repulsa Caesaris decedentis gratiam convellere
cupiebant. Hunc etsi augurem prius faetum quam Italiam attingeret in
itinere audierat, tamen non minus iustam sibi causam municipia et
colonias adeundi existimavit, ut eis gratias ageret, quod frequentiam
atque officium suum Antonio praestitissent, simulque se et honorem suum
sequentis anni commendaret, propterea quod insolenter adversarii sui
gloriarentur L. Lentulum et C. Marcellum consules creatos qui omnem
honorem et dignitatem Caesaris spoliarent, ereptum Ser. Galbae
consulatum, cum is multo plus gratia suffragiisque valuisset, quod sibi
coniunctus et familiaritate et consuetudine legationis esset. |
§ 8:51. Caesar, on his arrival, was received by
the principal towns and colonies with incredible respect and
affection; for this was the first time he came since the war against
united Gaul. Nothing was omitted which could be thought of for the
ornament of the gates, roads, and every place through which Caesar was
to pass. All the people with their children went out to meet him.
Sacrifices were offered up in every quarter. The market places and
temples were laid out with entertainments, as if anticipating the joy
of a most splendid triumph. So great was the magnificence of the
richer and zeal of the poorer ranks of the people. |
Exceptus est Caesaris adventus ab omnibus municipiis et coloniis
incredibili honore atque amore. Tum primum enim veniebat ab illo
universae Galliae bello. Nihil relinquebatur quod ad ornatum portarum,
itinerum, locorum omnium qua Caesar iturus erat excogitari poterat. Cum
liberis omnis multitudo obviam procedebat, hostiae omnibus locis
immolabantur, tricliniis stratis fora templaque occupabantur, ut vel
exspectatissimi triumphi laetitia praecipi posset. Tanta erat
magnificentia apud opulentiores, cupiditas apud humiliores. |
§ 8:52. When Caesar had gone through all the
states of Cisalpine Gaul, he returned with the greatest haste to the
army at Nemetocenna; and having ordered all his legions to march from
winter quarters to the territories of the Treviri, he went thither and
reviewed them. He made Titus Labienus governor of Cisalpine Gaul, that
he might be the more inclined to support him in his suit for the
consulate. He himself made such journeys as he thought would conduce
to the health of his men by change of air; and though he was
frequently told that Labienus was solicited by his enemies, and was
assured that a scheme was in agitation by the contrivance of a few,
that the senate should interpose their authority to deprive him of a
part of his army; yet he neither gave credit to any story concerning
Labienus, nor could be prevailed upon to do any thing in opposition to
the authority of the senate; for he thought that his cause would be
easily gained by the free voice of the senators. For Caius Curio, one
of the tribunes of the people, having undertaken to defend Caesar's
cause and dignity, had often proposed to the senate, "that if the
dread of Caesar's arms rendered any apprehensive, as Pompey's
authority and arms were no less formidable to the forum, both should
resign their command, and disband their armies. That then the city
would be free, and enjoy its due rights." And he not only proposed
this, but of himself called upon the senate to divide on the question.
But the consuls and Pompey's friends interposed to prevent it; and
regulating matters as they desired, they broke up the meeting. |
Cum omnes regiones Galliae togatae Caesar percucurrisset, summa
celeritate ad exercitum Nemetocennam rediit legionibusque ex omnibus
hibernis ad fines Treverorum evocatis eo profectus est ibique exercitum
lustravit. T. Labienum Galliae togatae praefecit, quo maiore
commendatione conciliaretur ad consulatus petitionem. Ipse tantum
itinerum faciebat, quantum satis esse ad mutationem locorum propter
salubritatem existimabat. Ibi quamquam crebro audiebat Labienum ab
inimicis suis sollicitari certiorque fiebat id agi paucorum consiliis, ut
interposita senatus auctoritate aliqua parte exercitus spoliaretur, tamen
neque de Labieno credidit quidquam neque contra senatus auctoritatem ut
aliquid faceret potuit adduci. Iudicabat enim liberis sententiis patrum
conscriptorum causam suam facile obtineri. Nam C. Curio, tribunus plebis,
cum Caesaris causam dignitatemque defendendam suscepisset, saepe erat
senatui pollicitus, si quem timor armorum Caesaris laederet, et quoniam
Pompei dominatio atque arma non minimum terrorem foro inferrent,
discederet uterque ab armis exercitusque dimitteret: fore eo facto
liberam et sui iuris civitatem. Neque hoc tantum pollicitus est, sed
etiam sc. per discessionem facere coepit; quod ne fieret consules
amicique Pompei iusserunt atque ita rem morando discusserunt. |
§ 8:53. This testimony of the unanimous voice of
the senate was very great, and consistent with their former conduct;
for the preceding year, when Marcellus attacked Caesar's dignity, he
proposed to the senate, contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, to
dispose of Caesar's province, before the expiration of his command,
and when the votes were called for, and Marcellus, who endeavored to
advance his own dignity, by raising envy against Caesar, wanted a
division, the full senate went over to the opposite side. The spirit
of Caesar's foes was not broken by this, but it taught them, that they
ought to strengthen their interest by enlarging their connections, so
as to force the senate to comply with whatever they had resolved
on. |
Magnum hoc testimonium senatus erat universi conveniensque superiori
facto. Nam Marcellus proximo anno, cum impugnaret Caesaris dignitatem,
contra legem Pompei et Crassi rettulerat ante tempus ad senatum de
Caesaris provinciis, sententiisque dictis discessionem faciente Marcello,
qui sibi omnem dignitatem ex Caesaris invidia quaerebat, senatus frequens
in alia omnia transiit. Quibus non frangebantur animi inimicorum
Caesaris, sed admonebantur quo maiores pararent necessitates, quibus cogi
posset senatus id probare, quod ipsi constituissent. |
§ 8:54. After this a decree was passed by the
senate, that one legion should be sent by Pompey, and another by
Caesar, to the Parthian war. But these two legions were evidently
drawn from Caesar alone. For the first legion which Pompey sent to
Caesar, he gave Caesar, as if it belonged to himself, though it was
levied in Caesar's province. Caesar, however, though no one could
doubt the design of his enemies, sent the legion back to Cneius
Pompey, and in compliance with the decree of the senate, ordered the
fifteenth, belonging to himself, and which was quartered in Cisalpine
Gaul, to be delivered up. In its room he sent the thirteenth into
Italy, to protect the garrisons from which he had drafted the
fifteenth. He disposed his army in winter quarters, placed Caius
Trebonius, with four legions among the Belgae, and detached Caius
Fabius, with four more, to the Aedui; for he thought that Gaul would
be most secure, if the Belgae, a people of the greatest valor, and the
Aedui, who possessed the most powerful influence, were kept in awe by
his armies. |
Fit deinde senatus consultum, ut ad bellum Parthi cum legio una a Cn.
Pompeio, altera a C. Caesare mitteretur; neque obscure duae legiones uni
detrahuntur. Nam Cn. Pompeius legionem primam, quam ad Caesarem miserat,
confectam ex delectu provinciae Caesaris, eam tamquam ex suo numero
dedit. Caesar tamen, cum de voluntate minime dubium esset adversariorum
suorum, Pompeio legionem remisit et suo nomine quintam decimam, quam in
Gallia citeriore habuerat, ex senatus consulto iubet tradi. In eius locum
tertiam decimam legionem in Italiam mittit quae praesidia tueretur, ex
quibus praesidiis quinta decima deducebatur. Ipse exercitui distribuit
hiberna: C. Trebonium cum legionibus quattuor in Belgio collocat, C.
Fabium cum totidem in Aeduos deducit. Sic enim existimabat tutissimam
fore Galliam, si Belgae, quorum maxima virtus, Aedui, quorum auctoritas
summa esset, exercitibus continerentur. Ipse in Italiam profectus
est. |
§ 8:55. He himself set out for Italy; where he
was informed on his arrival that the two legions sent home by him and
which, by the senate's decree, should have been sent to the Parthian
war, had been delivered over to Pompey, by Caius Marcellus the consul,
and were retained in Italy. Although from this transaction it was
evident to every one that war was designed against Caesar, yet he
resolved to submit to any thing, as long as there were hopes left of
deciding the dispute in an equitable manner, rather than to have
recourse to arms. |
Quo cum venisset, cognoscit per C. Marcellum consulem legiones duas
ab se remissas, quae ex senatus consulto deberent ad Parthicum bellum
duci, Cn. Pompeio traditas atque in Italia retentas esse. Hoc facto
quamquam nulli erat dubium, quidnam contra Caesarem pararetur, tamen
Caesar omnia patienda esse statuit, quoad sibi spes aliqua relinqueretur
iure potius disceptandi quam belli gerendi. Contendit... |